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Abstract President Cardoso's recent assessment of the prospects for “globalized
social democracy” raises, once again, the question of what space for agency exists
within the global political economy for actors in the South, which was central to the
analysis Cardoso and Faletto presented in Dependency and Development 40 years
ago. Dependency and Development's “historical–structural” approach balanced belief
in the possibility of political agency with a keen appreciation of structural constraint.
Cardoso's current exploration of global possibilities carries forward both tradition of
the historical–structural method, arguing that social democracy is an option in the
South and that the globalized social democrats in the South will play a growing role
in shaping global political institutions. He does not explore the possibility that social
democrats in the South may need to play a role in shaping global economic rules.
This paper argues that reconstructing global market rules is crucial to the long-run
success of “globalized social democracies” in the South and that such reconstruction,
however difficult, lies within the realm of the historically viable.
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How can we build on the insights of Dependency and Development in Latin America?
Can the approach offered by Cardoso and Faletto 40 years ago still give us leverage in
analyzing the comparative political economy of development? It should. Dependency
and Development was an immediate classic four decades ago in the Global North as
well as in Latin America. One of the definitions of classics is that their lessons endure.
In this case, one of the authors has provided his own assessment of what we
should take away from Dependency and Development. In his article for this special
issue, President Cardoso looks back and reflects on what has changed in the ensuing
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40 years. His view of our current world incorporates his experience as a national and
international leader who helped shape change, as well as his continuing role as an
intellectual who observes and analyzes the results.
Commenting on a classic and the reflections of its eminent author may be hubris,
but it is worth the risk if it stimulates further debate on both Dependency and
Development and Cardoso's current reflections. I will try to push the debate forward
by focusing on President Cardoso's concept of “globalized social democracy.”
Analyzing the space for agency within the global political economy was a
pervasive general theme in Dependency and Development. President Cardoso's
discussion of “globalized social democracy” brings this issue to the fore once more.
The idea of globalized social democracy has no obvious antecedent in Dependency
and Development, but exploring it offers an opportunity to underline the continuing
relevance of Cardoso and Faletto's theoretical and methodological approach. Before
turning to globalized social democracy, I will begin with a quick review of the
general perspectives on agency in Dependency and Development and in President
Cardoso's recent reflections.
Political Agency and the “Historical–Structural” Approach
Dependency and Development aggressively rejected the idea that national situations were
“mechanically conditioned by external domination” (1979: 173).1 It offered both North
Americans and Latin Americans a way of moving beyond earlier forms of “structural
analysis,” whether in the form of mechanical theories of imperialism or equally one-
dimensional theories of modernization. The book ends with a paean to “collective action
guided by political wills that make work what is structurally barely possible” (1979: 176).
Insistence on agency was carefully balanced by an appreciation of structural
constraint. While Cardoso and Faletto applauded making work “what is structurally
barely possible,” they insisted that effective action also requires recognizing what is
not structurally possible. For Cardoso and Faletto, “the course of history depends on
the daring of those who propose to act in terms of historically viable goals”
(1979: 176). Being too timid to recognize that “barely structurally possible” strategies
may be possible is one route to failure; being too stubborn to recognize that certain
forms of change are not “historically viable” is the other.
This sophisticated rendition of the proposition that “people make history but not
as they choose” is fundamental to Dependency and Development, both methodo-
logically and politically. Methodologically, it grounded Cardoso and Faletto’s
strategy of focusing on national variations in “situations of dependency.” Politically,
it aligned them with what Albert Hirschman would later label “a bias for hope.”
Romantically voluntaristic visions of transformative rupture and “structural
pessimist”2 rejections of the possibility of progressive change were both rife when
1 Page numbers for Dependency and Development refer to the 1979 English edition published by the
University of California Press.
2 By “structural pessimist,” I mean a political vision which assumes that the prevailing global power
relations cannot be changed by political agency, are vulnerable only to cataclysmic collapse induced by
their own structural contradictions, and leave no room for progressive variation at the national level. See
Evans (2008)) for a more extended discussion.
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Dependency and Development was written. Both stood in the way of historical
structural analysis. The structural pessimists' privileging of external domination
made the comparative analysis of concrete “political struggles of groups and classes”
in the Global South seems like a fruitless exercise. What difference could national
variations possibly make? Romantic voluntarism made such analysis seem
superfluous. Whatever the constraints were they would soon be overthrown.
Transcending this sterile dichotomy was fundamental to Cardoso and Faletto's
extraordinary success. Their perspective put comparative analysis of the concrete
“networks of interests and coercions that bind some social groups to others, some
classes to others” (1979: 173) at the center of the political and intellectual agenda.
While they did not propose concrete strategies for change, their analysis provided a
framework for assessing the potential efficacy of different courses of action.
Forty years later, Cardoso continues to carry forward both the methodological and
the political tradition. He argues that structural factors “condition—but do not
determine—the shape taken by economic and political processes” (2009: 315).
Globalization notwithstanding, a “certain margin of autonomy” for political strategy
continues to remain (2009: 315).3 As in Dependency and Development, he closes his
argument by underlining that the future of developing countries will depend “mainly,
on the capacity of local societies and their leaders to frame policies...that seize
opportunities” (2009: 316).
Cardoso still insists that “people make history but not as they choose” is a
fundamental axiom for the analysis of political and economic trajectories. His
assessment of “historically viable goals” does, however, seems to have shifted. In
2008, he is more optimistic that the well-being of ordinary citizens can be improved
within the matrix of a global capitalist economy. Consequently, he is more willing to
take the current structure of global market rules as given.
In the preface to the English edition of Dependency and Development, Cardoso
and Faletto were very explicit about the limits of capitalist development.
It is not realistic to imagine that capitalist development will solve basic
problems for the majority of the population. In the end, what has to be discussed as
an alternative is not the consolidation of the state and the fulfillment of
“autonomous capitalism” but how to supersede them. The important question,
then, is how to construct paths toward socialism (1979: xxiv).4
The centrality of the socialist alternative is underlined again in the postscript to
the English edition where Cardoso and Faletto argue that the “effective battle” is
between “technocratic elitism” and a vision that can succeed in “transforming the
demand for a more developed economy and a more democratic society into a state
that expresses the vitality of truly popular forces, capable of seeking socialist forms
for the social organization of the future (1979: 216).”
3 Page numbers are from the 9/29 version of “New Paths: Globalization in Historical Perspective” (with
14 point type).
4 Or, “By development in this context, we mean ‘capitalist development....’. So, we do not mean by the
notion of ‘development’ the achievement of a more egalitarian or more just society. These are not
consequences expected from capitalist development, especially in peripheral economies (1979: xxiii).”
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In 2008, Cardoso sees at least certain nations of Latin America as capable of
“active policies geared to reducing poverty and enhancing social well-being (2009:
309)” even while operating within a generally capitalist framework, nationally and
globally. He also argues that “[t]he challenge of poverty is permanently at the core of
the global agenda” (2009: 302).
While Cardoso in 2008 assumes that market society is here to stay—both
nationally and globally—he makes no such assumption with regard to the specific
structures of political domination that currently preside over the global political
economy. Conviction that space for agency has expanded in relation to the global
political order complements Cardoso's greater optimism with regard to meeting the
needs of ordinary citizens within a market society.
Dependency and Development did not explicitly reject the possibility that
“collective action guided by political wills” might be efficacious beyond the
national level, but left the possibility unanalyzed. Cardoso and Faletto did not sign
on to the more ambitious “Third Worldist” agendas that assumed that rebellion in the
Global South would change the world. They did not invoke the 1950s spirit of
Bandung with its aspirations that the Global South might build collective global
action on the foundations of decolonization. Nor did they anticipate the 1970s
movement in search of a “New International Economic Order.” In Dependency and
Development, the national level is the site of potential agency; the global level is the
source of structural constraint.
Cardoso in 2008 also emphasizes global economic constraint. Indeed, he sees a
positive side to such constraints. He cites Romano Prodi's belief that taking Italy into
the EU would have a salutary effect because it would “impose the discipline from
the outside in” (2009: 313). Just as he sees more space for “well-being” enhancing
strategies under a market economy at the national level, Cardoso in 2008 also sees
more space at the global level for “forms of international integration that safeguard
national interests and ensure better standards of living, even though the global
economy is determinant” (2009: 301).
At the same time, Cardoso's 2008 vision sees global political structures as
surprisingly fragile. First, he considers the contemporary international balance of
power as indicating “the end of the possibility for Global Empire” (2009: 301).5
Second, he is convinced of the “fragility” of the central institutions of global
economic governance—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
For Cardoso, “they are clearly incapable of managing the dynamism of the global
economy” (2009: 299). The failures of existing global governance create the need
for a “new global pact.” As the possibility of the old G7 nations dominating the
construction of this new pact wanes, the “emerging nations of the Global South,
most prominently but by no means exclusively, the BRIC countries,”6 will all count
in the shaping of a new global order in the twenty-first century” (2009: 304).
Cardoso's vision goes beyond asserting that countries from the Global South will
become players in the existing global system of political and economic domination.
For him, in the expanded participation of the South holds the promise of helping
5 “There is no military might or moral convening power capable of upholding a world controlled neither
by a single hyper-power nor by a coalition of a few superpowers” (2009: 302).
6 Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
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make the twenty-first century international order “more interested in the cooperation
among nations to overcome poverty, the energy imbalance, and environmental
issues, and to reduce inequalities” (2009: 304). In short, Cardoso's version of the
twenty-first century takes existing global markets as givens, but offers ample space
for global political agency.
Globalized Social Democracy
Given a framework that emphasizes opportunities for increasing the well-being of
ordinary citizens in the South within the framework of a market economy and
combines this possibility with a vision of a global political order in flux and open to
agentive action, it is hardly surprising that globalized social democracy comes to the
fore as a central concept in Cardoso's 2008 analysis.
In 2008, as in Dependency and Development, the empirical analysis revolves
around comparisons among the major countries in Latin America. Antecedent
economic strengths and weaknesses, more or less adept political strategies, and the
ability of classes and social groups to “establishmore solid institutional norms” combine
in different ways to create a continentally scaled “complex array of situations with
different shapes and opportunities for integrating into the globalizedworld” (2009: 306).
The most promising form of integration is what Cardoso labels “globalized social
democracy,” an agenda followed by Brazil under his own Presidency and, with some
variation, by the succeeding Worker's Party governments led by Lula (Luiz Inácio da
Silva) since becoming president in January 2003. Cardoso provides a succinct
definition of this model as “one that takes into account the power of markets, but
counterbalances its abuses by controlling it whenever possible, and that develops
social policies capable of fighting poverty and reducing inequality” (2009: 310).
To succeed, globalized social democracy must be able to “seize the opportunities
made available by the global market,” (2009: 310) intrepidly embracing the
globalization of its productive system. But this is only one side of success. Social
policies aimed at alleviating both poverty and inequality must be pursued with the
same aggressiveness. Both general social provision, like programs aimed at insuring
universal access to health care and education and policies that target at specific
disprivileged groups, like land reform and direct cash transfers, must receive the
same level of policy attention that is given to strategies aimed at achieving more
favorable integration with the global economy.
To some, globalized social democracy might seem like a contradictory
combination. Conventional wisdom in Latin America (and the USA) has associated
aggressive efforts at enhancing local welfare with attempts to insulate the domestic
economy from the vagaries of global markets. In fact, something very much like
Cardoso's globalized social democracy has been a dominant strategy in Europe for at
least a half century (see Cameron 1984; Katzenstein 1984; Rodrik 1997). Moreover,
Sandbrook et al. (2007: chapters 7 and 8) have recently argued that the same logic
applies to the Global South.
Like the politics of the “situations of dependency” discussed in Dependency and
Development, the dynamics of globalized social democracy are driven by the “the
actions of groups, classes, organizations and social movements” (1979: 174) in
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responding to historically given structural constraints. Cardoso notes that in order to
succeed in the globalized social democratic project, national political leaders and the
state apparatuses they command must “foster and accept cooperation from non-
governmental organizations, including groups from the middle classes and even
private entrepreneurs who embed themselves into public policies” (2009: 312).
Just as Cardoso's vision of globalized social democracy is faithful to the analytical
strategy of Dependency and Development, it carries forward the political spirit of the
earlier work. Cardoso and Faletto formulated their perspective before Albert
Hirschman formally set out his advocacy of “a bias for hope,” but Hirschman's
vision fits that of Dependency and Development, as they acknowledge in their
preface to the English edition (1979: xi).7
Hirschman argued that it was essential to go beyond proposing “strictly incremental
changes” but at the same time necessary to avoid proposals “so revolutionary or so
utopian that they have no chance of whatever to be adopted in the absence of prior total
political change” (1971: 29). Cardoso and Faletto's insistence that political
determination, skill, and imagination could “make work what is structurally barely
possible” was very consistent with Hirschman's pragmatic optimism.
Cardoso's current insistence that it is possible for countries in the Global South to
pursue the goals of well-being and social protection traditionally associated with
social democracy in the rich countries of the Global North is even more clearly in the
Hirschmanian tradition of “a bias for hope.” It implies impressive political agency in
the face of daunting structural constraint.
When it comes to exercising agency in the global arena, however, Cardoso's
position seems to depend on whether the object of agency is the political order or the
economic one. Despite characterizing contemporary Latin American social democ-
racy as “globalized,” Cardoso does not raise the question of what kind of global
economic rules globalized social democrats might need to allow their national
economic agendas to succeed. His intriguing assertions with regard to the
possibilities for political agency at the global level are not taken up again when he
discusses the economic and welfare goals of globalized social democracy.
By introducing the concept of globalized social democracy, Cardoso sets up a
challenge. If economic engagement with the global political economy is central to
globalized social democracy as a developmental trajectory, then it is hard to believe
that its success does not depend on what kinds of rules govern global markets. It is
equally hard to believe that global rules constructed by capital in the North favor the
constituencies of social democracy in the South. Together, these assumptions imply
that the proponents of globalized social democracy must reshape global market rules
if they are to succeed. Figuring out whether this is possible is the challenge posed by
Cardoso's analysis.
Extending the Analysis of Globalized Social Democracy
In addressing this challenge, I argue first for the assumption that the success of social
democratic strategies in the Global South depends, in the long run, on the ability of
7 The preface was written in 1976.
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social groups and political leaders interested in pursuing such strategies discovering
ways to exercise agency with respect to rules that govern global markets. Then, I
argue, based on the concrete experience of recent decades, that such exercise of
agency lies within the realm of “historically viable” goals. Finally, I will set out the
obvious political obstacles that make effective action by social democrats in the
South vis-a-vis global economic governance “structurally barely possible.” In short,
reconstructing global market rules is exactly the sort of arena to which the historical–
structural perspective is most fruitfully applied: a case in which collective action and
political will are essential and success must be won in the face of severe structural
constraint, if it is to be won at all.
The argument for reconstructing global market rules will be developed in four
interconnected arenas. Trade rules are an obvious case. “Investors rights,” which are
central to most “free trade” agreements, are a second. Global property rights rules,
which impose politically protected monopoly rights over the most important form of
contemporary assets, are even more important in the long run. Finally, the latest
global financial crisis has underlined again the costs to the Global South of the
inability of Northern dominated institutions to construct the kind of robust, stable
financial markets that are necessary to promote development in the South.
Having made a case for why globalized social democracies need to reshape global
markets in order to succeed, I turn, in the following section, to why such an effort
might lie within the realm of “historically viable” options. My arguments for the
political possibility of global agency begin by echoing the arguments at the
beginning of Cardoso's essay. Existing global governance institutions are weak and
vulnerable and need “buy-in” from the major countries of the Global South if they
are to survive. As the world inexorably becomes more “multi-polar” and the relative
weakness of the US economy becomes more apparent, opportunities for the South to
exercise agency expand.
Unfortunately, focusing on the public face of global governance makes market rules
appearmoremalleable than they are. Private actors, operating behind the façade of public
institutions and arenas, construct most global market rules. The current financial crisis
notwithstanding, these actors remain powerful and politically connected. Reconstructing
global market rules to facilitate globalized social democracy in the South would
challenge the vested interests of private capital, a much harder task than attacking
enfeebled public institutions like the IMF or theWorld Bank. Facing this reality forces us
to take the question of whether agency by the proponents of globalized social democracy
with respect to global market rules is “historically viable” very seriously.
Why Try to Reconstruct Global Markets?
Must globalized social democracies in the South reconstruct the rules that govern
global markets in order to be successful? Cardoso does not appear to think so, but
there are strong arguments for taking action with regard to global economic rules.8
8 Sandbrook et al. (2007) also analyze the possibilities of the success of social democracies on the
periphery without raising the question of changing global market rules, but their cases are all small
countries that have little choice but to live with existing global rules, unless larger social democracies in
the south are willing to lead efforts at reconstruction.
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Modern economic theory recognizes markets as complex, socially embedded
institutions whose outcomes are contingent on the institutional matrix in which
they are embedded. Historically, the success of social democracy has always
depended on reshaping market rules. In the contemporary world, this includes global
markets as well as national ones.9
For social democracies, reconstruction of labor markets with the aim of protecting
the dignity and well-being of workers is a foundational goal. Similar goals drive
efforts to reconstruct markets involved in the provision of basic services like health
and education, as well as markets for basic goods like food, transportation, and
housing. More recently, curbing the potentially destructive externalities involved in
the consumption of natural resources is an increasingly central goal. In short,
constructing distinctively “social democratic markets” is the heart of social
democratic politics.
As national borders become less effective at differentiating markets, the politics of
market construction become increasingly global. Distinctive national markets are not
just undermined by the economic porousness of borders. The heightened legitimacy
of domestically intrusive global market rules turns distinctive national markets into
endangered species in all but the most powerful countries (Wade 2003). As John
Ruggie (1994) cogently observed more than a decade ago, global rules now impinge
on what was once considered domestic policy to a far greater degree than they did
during the original post-World War II efforts to “internationalize” economic growth.
The specific relationship between existing global market rules and social
democratic goals in the Global South gives the case for reconstruction extra weight.
Because global markets have been constructed over the course of the last 400 years
by capital and the states in the North, the rules were not designed to be friendly to
the Global South, or to social democratic agendas. Social democratic agendas need
market rules that balance the needs of the less privileged social groups against those
of capital. Even capital in the South suffers from market rules biased in favor of
established monopolies in the North. Rich social democracies of the Global North
may suffer from the bias in favor of capital, but poor social democracies in the
Global South suffer from both the class bias and the regional bias. The current
domestic intrusiveness of global economic regulations, especially in the South,
magnifies the effects of biased global rules.
The hypocrisy of current trade rules illustrates the regional dimension of the bias
in the governance of global markets. Differential enforcement of “free trade”
corresponds to regional differences in export profiles and competitiveness. On the
one hand, subsidies and barriers to market access are etched into the structure of
global agricultural markets for products in which rich country producers have
disadvantageous cost structures. On the other, efforts on the part of countries of the
Global South to set rules that might enable them to gain economies of scale in key
areas of manufacturing are condemned as economically irrational “protectionism.”
9 Special credit for establishing this perspective in the contemporary social sciences should go to Polanyi
(2001[1944]) for arguing so forcefully that such a disembedded, self-regulating market would have
catastrophic consequences were one to actually be instantiated and persist. See also Fligstein (2001) for a
contemporary analysis of market construction.
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The costs to the Global South of biased definitions of “free trade” are substantial.10
Oxfam's (2002: 98) estimate is $100 billion a year. William Cline (2004) estimates
that 400 million people a year are in poverty in the Global South because of unfair
trade rules imposed by the North.
Rules governing the treatment of capital are as central to most modern “trade
agreements” as rules about flows of commodities. Modern “trade agreements”
reconstruct the domestic markets of all countries involved by expanding the rights of
investors,11 undercutting the ability of signatories to engage in the sort of regulation
of the behavior of capital normally associated with social democracy. Here, again,
there is also a regional bias. Despite the “globalization” of the biggest and most
successful corporations in the Global South,12 the vast bulk of the world's capital
and its owners are located in the rich countries of the North. The primary effect of
turning “trade agreements” into vehicles for protecting the profits of investors is to
shift returns to corporations based in the North.
Perhaps most fundamental to the construction of global markets are the rules that
define property rights. Current controversies over “intellectual property rights”
illustrate their importance. In the modern world, the most valuable and contentious
form of property is the right to appropriate returns from ideas, information, images,
and other intangible assets. Whereas maintaining “public order” is usually sufficient
for the owners of physical assets to feel secure in their property rights, intangible
assets require intensive, politically enforced protection. Such assets, such as
computer software or the chemical formulas involved in the production of
medications, are also key drivers of profits and growth.13 They are, as Weber and
Bussell (2005) put it, the steam engines of the twenty-first century. The current
property rights regime awards Northern corporations politically protected monopoly
rights over these assets and attempts to enforce these rights around the globe (Evans
2005).
Since intangible assets are non-rival goods, which can be used simultaneously by
any number of people around the globe, restricting their use by granting monopoly
rights has powerful negative implications, especially in the Global South. Monopoly
control of these “intangible steam engines” not only forces the South to pay costly
“tribute” to Northern corporations but also robs global society of potential
production,14 impedes innovation,15 and slows economic growth.
10 This remains true despite the South's recent windfall gains from the “China effect” in global markets.
See Castro (2007, 2008) on the benefits of the increasingly “Sino-centric” global economy.
11 For an example of this process, see the examination of NAFTA and the proposed Free Trade Agreement
of the Americas in Barenberg and Evans (2004)).
12 See Cardoso 2008 footnote 6.
13 Both the theoretical propositions of the “new growth” theory and econometric observations of
differential returns in the latter half of the twentieth century point to the centrality of “intangible assets” in
generating growth (see Aghion and Howitt 1998; Helpman 2004; Romer 1986, 1990).
14 The case of open-source software (Weber 2003) offers a nice illustration of the productive dividends
that non-exclusive property rights can deliver.
15 Opponents of this position will argue that the incentive effects of expected monopoly returns increase
the output of new ideas and outweigh the negative effects of subsequent restricted access. How the balance
works out in practice depends on specific institutional contexts. In the case of medications, for example,
the evidence would seem to support the negative consequences of enforcing monopoly rights. See Angell
(2004) for a popular but well-argued exposition.
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The consequences of allowing monopoly protection of rights to intangible assets
are especially negative for the Global South. Despite lower educational levels, the
South has an abundance of underutilized “human capital.”16 These skilled,
potentially productive individuals, lacking the access to productive capital that a
less exclusionary property rights regime would afford them, suffer from the twenty-
first century equivalent of the deprivation suffered in an earlier era by peasants
whose access to land is rationed to preserve the power of landlords. To realize the
productive potential currently kept idle, social democrats in the Global South must
contest current property rights rules at the global level.
If the global rules and institutions that defend intellectual property rights are
excessively muscular from the point of the Global South, the rules and institutions
that govern financial markets are excessively weak. In finance, private actors, who
weigh profit maximization far more heavily than stability and risk prevention, have
dominated market construction. The public rules and institutions that should increase
stability and alleviate risks are too weak to counter private bias. They lack the
capacity to enforce even the market rules that the private sector needs.
Once again, the costs of constructing markets to maximize the returns to vested
economic interests are borne disproportionately by the Global South. As Guillermo
Perry (2008) of the Center for Global Development recently pointed out, “financial
shocks are more frequent and costly in developing countries than in the developed
world, and their welfare costs are higher both in the short and long term.” The
countries of the Global South have been forced to lock up savings in foreign
exchange reserves that, in a less financially volatile world, could be invested to meet
the needs of their real economies. At the same time, high interest rates designed to
attract funds from foreign lenders reduce the range of new local investments that can
be considered economically viable. And, as the current financial crisis indicates,
even massive foreign reserves and high interest rates are insufficient to avoid attacks
on the currencies of the Global South.
The current construction of global financial markets clearly impedes social
democratic projects in the Global South. Yet, in the case of global financial markets,
the challenge facing social democrats in the South is less contestational than in areas
like property rights. State managers in the North and far-sighted global capitalists
would agree that more robust and enforceable rules are desirable despite their failure
to implement such rules. The challenge is mustering the political will to construct
better rules and build stronger institutions to enforce them.
Newly intrusive global rules stymie domestic efforts to introduce social protection
into labor markets and to expand the access of ordinary citizens to the productive
assets they need to become more productive. Biases toward Northern capital and
inadequate attention to stability and avoiding unnecessary shocks further prejudice
social democratic efforts to provide security and social protection. A playing field
that is already “tilted” against the social democratic agenda by the power of capital
in national political arenas is further tilted by global market rules.
16 The contradiction between property rights over intangible assets and development is not novel. As Ha-
Joon Chang (2002) emphasizes, the historical response of governments in the North to the negative
developmental consequences of granting exclusive property rights over ideas was essentially to ignore the
property rights of foreign corporations.
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Contemporary Efforts to Exercise Global Agency
Acknowledging that the long-run success of globalized social democracy depends on
reconstructing global markets shifts the focus to political feasibility. If the
reconstruction of global markets were clearly outside the bounds of the “historically
viable,” then focusing on global rules would only reinforce the “structural
pessimism” that Cardoso and Faletto were trying to escape. Fortunately, recent
experience suggests otherwise. Possibilities for global agency have been demon-
strated. They may even be expanding.
Seeing the South as an agent of global change is consistent with Cardoso's 2008
vision. He is unambiguous in his conviction that the South is going to “count in the
shaping of a new global order in the twenty-first century” (2009: 304). What he does
not address is whether the South can “count” in relation to the reconstruction of
global markets. When it comes to global economic rules, Cardoso appears to be
more convinced of the necessity of accepting the “discipline” imposed by existing
market rules.17 Accepting discipline and trying to discover competitive space within
the existing structure of the global political economy is, indeed, the predominant
mode of the South's relation to global markets. Nonetheless, recent decades have
seen numerous examples of contestation as well, including a number involving
Brazil. Looking at these examples is a good way to start thinking about the potential
space for agency.
Efforts to reconstruct global markets have taken a variety of forms. First, there are
“within the system” initiatives to force the North to conform to its own rules. The
World Trade Organization (WTO) has been a prime site for this sort of action. Such
challenges have the advantage of low collective action requirements. While several
countries may join together, failure to do so is not a barrier to action. Individual
countries can take the initiative. In addition, this kind of action usually benefits from
the unambiguous support of national economic elites.
Collective, multi-country efforts to shape new rules are more difficult but more
important. These can have negative agendas, as in fights against the imposition of new
regional “free trade” agreements. Or they can be a mixture of negative and positive
agendas as in the Global South's collective refusal to go along new sets of trade rules in
Seattle, Cancun, and Doha. Such contestation does not question the basic structure of
existing markets, but demands more consistency and less bias. They are essentially
more collective versions of the contestation of individual cases in the WTO.
Other efforts to shift accepted modes of implementing existing market rules are
more ambitious. Current struggles over how “intellectual property rights” should be
defined and exercised offer nice examples. Finally, there are efforts to reconstruct the
rules of global financial markets. These are the least developed of all, but the current
global financial crisis may have created new opportunities for the Global South in
this arena. Brazil's own actions vis-a-vis global market rules over the course of the
past two decades provide some of the best illustrations of different modes of
contestation. I will offer brief comments on few of them as illustrations.
To begin with, Brazil has been active within the WTO, successfully contesting
“rigged rules and double standards” on an individual basis and jointly with other
17 A la Romano Prodi—see Cardoso (22) and my discussion (p. 6) above.
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countries. Brazil has also been a player in most of the collective efforts to force the
North to accept less biased global trade rules, from Seattle through the Doha round.
Brazil has also contested property rights. Its fight against the politically enforced
monopoly rents enjoyed by “Big Pharma” is a specific example. Its efforts to build a
“Development Friendly Agenda” for reconstructing intellectual property rights at the
World Intellectual Property Rights Organization (WIPO) exemplify a general,
collective effort at reconstructing property rights.18
Removing the ability of powerful actors to enjoy particularistic exceptions to
general rules is the easiest form market reconstruction. Brazil's successful actions in
the WTO during both Cardoso and Lula administrations are good illustrative cases.
With a consistency that may seem surprising, Brazil succeeded in winning dispute
settlement cases against G7 countries forcing the North to withdraw subsidies and
special tariffs across a range of different product arenas from cotton to sugar to steel
to jet aircraft. Each case was different, but in each case, the fact that WTO moved
market competition from being embedded in informal power relations to being the
object of transparent, formal contestation worked to Brazil's advantage. I focus on
two cases: aircraft and cotton.
The fight between Brazil's Embraer and Canada's Bombardier, which began
during President Cardoso's administration, shows how important contesting de facto
market rules can be to efforts to build high value-added production in the Global
South. Both the Canadian and Brazilian governments were trying to sustain niches in
the lucrative and expending market for short to mid-range jet passenger planes. Both
were willing to do whatever was necessary to support their firms but needed the
legitimacy of conformity to global rules. Each accused the other of offering
illegitimate subsidies in filings to the WTO each. In the end, Brazil succeeded not
only in fending off the Canadian threat and forcing the Canadian government to
modify its support for Bombardier. A few years later, Embraer was in the running for
a contract to sell its planes to Air Canada.19
Had Brazil neglected to contest the way market rules were applied at the global
level, one of its signature hi-tech producers could have been driven out of a key
market with important technological spillovers. The Embraer case underlines, first of
all, that vigilance with respect to global rules must be an integral part strategies of
domestic accumulation. It also shows that despite the obvious Northern bias in the
politics, structure, and ideological assumptions of the WTO (see Chorev 2005), it is
still a venue in which southern social democrats can exercise agency. Brazil is not
the only country in the Global South to have figured this out. In the period from
2000 to 2004, WTO dispute settlement panels initiated by developing countries
against developed ones were more than three times more likely than cases initiated
by developed against developing countries.20
Brazil's WTO case against US cotton subsidies fits standard expectations more
closely: a country in the Global South contesting Northern protection of agricultural
18 Other sorts of cases could be added—for example, Brazil's contribution to derailing the free trade
agreement of the Americas (FTAA/ALCA) or its efforts to promote open-source software.
19 See Schrank and Kurtz (2005) for a discussion of the dispute with Bombardier and Embraer's
subsequent economic successes.
20 For data on WTO dispute settlement cases, see http://www.worldtradelaw.net/.
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producers. For precisely that reason, the case had broader implications for collective
action. Brazil argued that US subsidies to its domestic cotton producers were
illegitimate. The WTO dispute settlement panel concurred in 2004.21 Brazil's success
helped embolden the poor West African Countries of Benin, Chad, Mali, and
Burkina Faso for whom cotton exports are a crucial economic issue. They in turn
have made more full-fledged reductions in US cotton subsidies a central issue in the
prospective Doha round negotiations on agricultural subsidies.
If we turn from trade to contestation over prevailing definitions of intellectual
property rights, Brazil's role has been even more prominent. Two examples will be
developed here: (1) the specific case of redefining property rights with respect to
pharmaceuticals (most crucially anti-retroviral drugs) and (2) participation in the
general efforts to write more “development friendly” intellectual property rights
rules at WIPO.
Success in treating and preventing AIDS has been one of the most impressive
achievements of Brazil's globalized social democracy. Domestic politics were the
cornerstone of this accomplishment, but contesting global market rules and property
rights also played a central role. As the Brazilian government's fiscal commitments
to provide anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) to AIDS victims began to grow, it was clear
to José Serra (Cardoso's Minister of Health) that the obscene ratios between the
prices charged for these drugs and their actual costs of production were a threat to
Brazil's fight against AIDS (Shadlen 2008).
What followed from the 1990s to the present has been a complex political–legal
ballet in which Brazil both pressured globally for the right of poor countries to use
generic AIDS drugs and reconstructed its national patent laws to facilitate its ability
to use the space that existed within the global “TRIPS” regime. Brazil's principle
tool in its fight with Big Pharma was the threat of “compulsory licensing,” which
allowed Brazil (within the TRIPS regime) to issue a license for local firms to
produce ARVs that were patented by Big Pharma firms on grounds of overriding
public interest. In 2001, Brazil's threat to license one of Roche's patented ARVs was
sufficiently credible to extract a price reduction. Subsequently, the same tactics were
used against Abbott and Merck. In 2007, Brazil actually carried through with its
threat and issued a compulsory license to produce one of Merck's ARVs (Shadlen
2007: 567).
Brazil's successful contestation of pharmaceutical patents demonstrated the
potential effectiveness of taking action against regressive global property rules. It
did not, however, change the rules themselves. It only expanded the possibilities for
how they might be implemented at the national level. Brazil's efforts (working
together with Argentina and the other members of the “Group of Friends of
Development”) on behalf of the “Development Friendly Agenda” at WIPO have
been aimed at changing the rules themselves, opening up possibilities that would
also benefit countries more vulnerable and less willing to push the possibilities of
existing rules than Brazil itself.
21 Two months after winning the cotton case, Brazil won a similar case against EU subsidies to sugar
producers. A year earlier, it had won a case against US steel subsidies.
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Shifting the global property rights agenda away from more draconian enforce-
ment of existing rights in the direction of what is delicately called more
“development friendly” modes of property rights is a monumental task (Musungu
2007). The efforts of the “Group of Friends” have been painfully diplomatic. For
example, their opening proposal says cautiously:
Intellectual property protection cannot be seen as an end in itself, nor can the
harmonization of intellectual property laws leading to higher protection
standards in all countries, irrespective of their levels of development. The role
of intellectual property and its impact on development must be carefully
assessed on a case-by-case basis (WIPO 2004).
It is hard to imagine a less threatening statement of the issues. Yet, in the context
of powerful and deeply entrenched privilege, setting out this mild-mannered
declaration at WIPO was like nailing theses to the door of the church.
The response of the pharmaceutical industry and other sectors that benefit
from the current property rights regime to the proposals put forward by Brazil
and its allies at WIPO is indicative of the uncompromising resistance that any
such change will face. In addition to marshalling their political and organization
resources within WIPO, the industry opened a second front in the form of the
“Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement” (ACTA) launched through a more
dependable public organization—the US Special Trade Representative (see Shaw
2008; Sell 2008).
Under the apparently neutral rubric of “anti-counterfeiting,” ACTA would move
intellectual property rights firmly back in the direction of draconian enforcement. It
was proposed as a “plurilateral” treaty, which is to say that it could be advanced
initially by a small group of states from the North (led by the USA). The strategy
was aimed at bypassing the Global South in the construction of a new set of property
rights rules that could be imposed on any country that wanted to trade with the
signatories. On the one hand, this response to Brazil's engagement on behalf of more
“development friendly” property rights is an indication of just how difficult it is to
reconstruct global markets. Yet, the fact that Northern corporate interests no longer
felt secure in relying on traditional global governance venues like WIPO to defend
their interests must be considered a significant retreat in the face of the South's new
efforts.
The obduracy with which Northern capital defends its property rights in the face
of initiatives in the South stands in revealing contrast to current efforts on the part of
Northern governments to increase the engagement of the South in the revitalization
of global governance institutions in the area of finance. The financial arena poses the
question of global agency in a very different way. The hypothetical future is more
interesting than past fights.
The recent Commonwealth initiative in favor of a “New Bretton Woods” offers a
nice illustration of how the recent financial crisis has focused attention on the
fragility of existing global financial governance and expanded the political space for
the participation of the Global South (Woods 2008). It also makes clear how hard it
is for collective efforts to reconstruct global financial governance to get beyond the
most marginal and superficial changes.
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After lamenting the institutional “crises” confronting both the IMF and the World
Bank, 22 the report goes on to underline that the anachronistic nature of governance
structures that give veto power to the USA23 focuses heavily on the importance of
getting increased “buy-in” from the major countries of the Global South, recognizing
that countries like Brazil “have little incentive to push for reform within formal
structures which are tilted against them” (Woods 2008: 2). While such openness to
an expanded role for the Global South in reconstructing global financial governance
is hardly pervasive among politicians and state managers in the North (say nothing
of the board rooms of private financial corporations), it still indicates that the
exercise of agency by countries of the South in the structuring of global market rules
is no longer considered a fanciful proposition, even in the North.
Across a range of global economic arenas, the Global South's efforts to
reconstruct market rules are on-going, sometimes meeting intransigence, as in the
case of intellectual property rights, occasionally encouraged as in the recent efforts
to restructure the governance of global financial markets.
Is Global Agency “Historically Viable”?
Skeptics will not be impressed by the examples I have offered. They will argue that
only the most marginal changes have been achieved and that significant
reconstruction of global market rules is not a “historically viable” agenda. They
are right to be skeptical. Even though examples of efforts by the South to shift global
market rules are not hard to find, the exercise of global agency still remains in the
realm of the “structurally barely possible.” Panglossian assessments of the ease of
changing global market rules would be a disservice both to political leaders in the
Global South who are trying to effect change and to ordinary people who need new
rules if they are to look forward to enjoying the benefits of “globalized social
democracy.”
Two kinds of barriers stand in the way of the construction of global market rules
more supportive of social democratic projects in the South. The obvious impediment
is opposition from vested interests in the North. Even when the goal is forcing
Northern states to conform to their own definitions of markets as “level playing
fields,” the ability of vested interests to block change seems disproportionate to their
real economic and political power. Challenging the North's definition of what
constitutes a level playing field produces a more aggressive response. Defenders of
the “intellectual property rights” status quo may make strategic concessions, as in the
23 The report does not mince words with regard to the changed position of the USA, stating directly,
“Governance in the IMF reflects a world in which the US was the largest creditor and financial stability
depended upon decisions made in the USA or G7. Today, the USA is the world’s largest debtor and
financial stability depends as much on decisions being made in Beijing and Dubai” (Woods 2008: 2).
22 The commonwealth report notes (Woods 2008: 1) that the income of the IMF has “plummeted” to the
point that it faces a $400 million shortfall in 2010 and that while for the World Bank “the crisis is less
imminent,” the “pressures are building.” Cardoso (5) agrees but is less charitable not just noting the
“fragility” of these institutions but adding that they are “clearly incapable” of making an effective
contribution to the governance of the contemporary global economy.
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case of AIDS drugs, but they apply their almost inexhaustible resources with ferocity
and determination in defense of the general framework of monopoly protection.
Global financial governance illustrates a conceptually different, but equally
imposing, kind of obstacle to the exercise of agency at the global level. Northern
elites have a massive “collective action problem.” They are incapable of securing
even reconstructions that are in their own immediate interests. Even if they were
completely supportive of South-initiated social democratic restructuring, they are
bereft of the “infrastructural power” (Mann 1994) that would enable them to
implement the project.
Entrenched private resistance and public incapacity is a formidable combination.
Global economic power is largely private, obdurate, and unaccountable. Public power
is more vulnerable to contestation, but resides in a politically fractured global political
structure, crippled with respect to their capacity for constructive collective action.
The collective action problems faced by the “globalized social democrats”
themselves create additional obstacles. The simplified language in which the nations
of the “South” confront the “North” must be complicated in order to become
realistic. Conceptualizing the “South” as a homogenous block of nations with fully
overlapping shared interests violates empirical reality. Instead, any consideration of
efforts to restructure global markets must deal, first of all, with the immense and
rapidly increasing heterogeneity of the “South.” The current national agendas of
China and Haiti have little in common, and it is unclear whether Korea should be
located in the North or the South.
This is not to deny the existence of a set of interests that transcend the
heterogeneity. The historical hegemony of the North created shared interests in the
South that persist. Private property rights, particularly rights with regard to
intangible assets, remain concentrated in the North while poverty is overwhelmingly
concentrated in the South. The problem is that the operational content of shared
interests must be continuously defined and redefined through political interchange.
Then, even if shared interests can be identified, poor countries must be convinced to
give them priority over short-term deals that speak directly to their individual
national interests.
What is surprising is that the countries of the South have been able to engage in
collective action at all. Building from a blocking coalition in Seattle to one with a
positive agenda in Cancun, forming the original “Group of 20” and avoiding
fragmentation and capitulation in the Doha round has been an impressive sequence
of successful collective action. Analysis of how this capacity for collective action
among the nations of the Global South emerged and has been sustained is one key to
understanding the potential for global agency.
Trying to achieve a social democratic agenda in relation to the reconstruction of
global markets also creates collective action problems at the national level. The
assumption that “nations” have unitary interests with respect to global economic
issues is as unsustainable today as it was in the days of traditional, export-dependent
landholders, “comprador” bourgeoisies, and settler elites. As Cardoso points out
(footnote 6), the most successful local corporations in the South have redefined their
interests in global terms. Even firms unable to become global actors themselves are
increasingly enmeshed in transnational networks. Exploration of the future of
globalized social democracy must include an assessment of the possibilities for
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transcending increasingly divergent interests at the national level, then consider how
the resulting compromises might be aggregated to enable collective action
internationally.
How can we go about analyzing such a bewildering multilevel combination of
partially shared interests and complex alliances? Cardoso and Faletto's “historical–
structural” method continues to offer an apt methodological model. While it has
been generally used for analyses of national “situations of dependency” that take the
politics of the global arena as essentially exogenous, there is no reason why Cardoso
and Faletto's methodology cannot be extended to political dynamics that include
political action at the global level.
What better strategy for analyzing the complexities of global political action than
starting with a respectful acknowledgement of the power of structural determination,
then adding a careful analysis of the “networks of interest” that “bind some social
groups to others” (Cardoso and Faletto 1979: 173) along with analysis of conflicts
among classes and social groups and between these and the state (Cardoso and
Faletto 1979: 174), considered with an appreciation for the political dynamics
created by contradictions between national agendas and those imposed by the global
political economy (Cardoso and Faletto 1979: 174)? Just as it makes sense to extend
the substantive analysis of “globalized social democracy” to the global arena, it
makes sense to extend Cardoso and Faletto's methodological approach.
Just as Cardoso and Faletto's analysis of national situations of dependency made
no claim to predict an obvious logic of national transformation, the “historical
structural” method is unlikely to produce a prognostication of easy agency in
contemporary global arenas. Nonetheless, looking at current global politics through
the lens of the historical structural method still offers the best analytical foundation
for debates on political strategy.
Globalizing the Bias for Hope
Reconstructing global markets to create a world friendlier to “globalized social
democracy” is a project at the boundary the “historically viable.” At the same time,
accepting the current institutionalization of global markets as given is not a practical
option for social democrats in the South. Even the most pragmatic globalized social
democrats have found it impossible to avoid challenging global rules. Brazil is
unlikely to abandon its aggressive activism in the WTO or its carefully incremental
challenges in WIPO. It is also unlikely to withdraw from collective efforts to
challenge global trading rules. The same is true of other major countries of the
Global South. As long as this is the case, the search for effective global strategies
makes sense. Leaving the construction of global markets to the corporate North risks
the sustainability of policy successes at the national level in the South.
In the century just past, consolidating the original achievement of social
democratic gains in the North depended on winning difficult domestic battles, but
it also depended on the post-World War II restructuring of global market rules.
Currently, global market rules impede social democratic agendas in the South.
Friendlier global market rules would significantly facilitate social democratic
agendas at the domestic level.
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Failing to give serious consideration to the possibility of agency at the global
level would be inconsistent with Hirschman's “bias for hope” and the political
epistemology of Dependency and Development. Were Hirschman involved in the
current “Bretton Woods II” initiative, he would undoubtedly be crafting proposals
that have “concrete institutional detail, thereby deliberately creating the optical
illusion that they could possibly be adopted tomorrow by men of good
will”(Hirschman 1971: 29). Likewise, it is in the arena of global political action
that we most need to remember Cardoso and Faletto's admonition that future events
will depend on “collective action guided by political wills that make work what is
structurally barely possible.”
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